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THE BROKER'S DUTY TO HIS CUSTOMER UNDER
EVOLVING FEDERAL FIDUCIARY AND SUITABILITY
STANDARDS
F. HARRIS NIcHOLS*
A federal common law rule that imposes a fiduciary duty upon
brokers to act in accordance with a standard of suitability in
handling their customers' accounts is evolving. This fiduciary stan-
dard applies not only to the investments selected for a particular
customer, but also makes a broker a fiduciary with respect to the use
of credit, the number of transactions in the account and the types
of information which the broker must supply his customer. Disre-
gard of these suitability and fiduciary responsibilities can result in
civil liability for the broker.
Depending on the law in a particular circuit, a standard of
suitability and fiduciary responsibility may be invoked through the
use of stock exchange rules,1 sections 10 and 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,2 rule 1Ob-5 thereunder,3 or discovery of an
express or implied "fiduciary" relationship between broker and
customer. 4 In addition, rules against excessive trading of a cus-
tomer's account (churning),5 and the duty of a broker to disclose to
his customer his own status as a market maker or a principal," have
been used to enforce a standard of suitability and fiduciary respon-
sibility, as have the margin rules, which limit the amount of bor-
rowed funds which may be used' and, to a lesser extent, the type
of security which may be purchased with them." These rules and
the judicial decisions applying them usually are not phrased in
terms of suitability; yet, by imposing on a broker fiduciary duties
* Member, New York Bar. B.A., Williams College, 1958; LL.B., Harvard University,
1961.
1. See text accompanying notes 9-58 infra.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78o (1970).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally 1-3 A. BROM-
BERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC R.ULE lOb-5 (1975).
4. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 59-78 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 107-123 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 79-106 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to monitor all these aspects of a customer's account, they have that
effect.
I. SUITABILITY
A. The Substantive Standard
Perhaps the most obvious application of the suitability stan-
dard is a broker's responsibility for the type of securities purchased
and sold for a customer's account. The duty of a broker to deter-
mine whether securities purchased by a customer are suitable for
his account is explicit in rules adopted by the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD)9 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 10 and may be derived from the "Know Your Cus-
tomer" rules of the New York"' and American 12 stock exchanges.
The exchange and NASD suitability rules were adopted pursuant
to sections 61 and 15A 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which require exchanges and self-regulatory associations of broker-
dealers to have such rules as the commission may determine to be
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors."'15
The NASD rule requires that a broker, in recommending
purchase or sale of a security, "shall have reasonable grounds for
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his
other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs."10
By contrast, the SEC rule-which applies to brokers who are not
members of the NASD or of a registered exchange-requires recom-
mendations to be "not unsuitable"; more significantly, it elimi-
nates the words "if any," and affirmatively requires a broker to
make "reasonable inquiry concerning the customer's investment
objectives, financial situation and needs. . . ."" In disciplinary
9. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, [1975] NASD SEcuRIIES DEALERS
MANUAL (CC) 2152.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1976).
11. N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 405, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULES
2405 (1975).
12. Amer. Stock Exch. Rule 411, [1976] AMER. STOCK EXcH. GUIDE (CCH) 9431.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a), 78o-3(a) (1970).
16. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, [1975] NASD SECURITIES DEALERS
MANUAL (CCH) 2152.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1976).
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actions against broker-dealers, moreover, the SEC has interpreted
the NASD rule to require inquiry by a broker into his customer's
situation.1 8 The exchange rules also require member brokers to
use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every cus-
tomer, order, and cash or margin account. 19 These rules constitute
the first step in the implication of a larger fiduciary duty to deter-
mine whether an investment is suitable for a customer.20
The determination of what are suitable purchases or sales may
involve consideration of a number of complex questions. Some ob-
vious ones are: (1) Does a particular investment meet the cus-
tomer's particular objective, which may include preservation of
principal, production of income, long-term appreciation and specu-
lation?21 (2) Is the total portfolio properly diversified so that each
security balances some risks taken or avoided in the customer's
other securities or assets? 22
18. Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960). But see Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REp. (CCH) 77,306 (1965). See also Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Cus-
tomers-The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 233, 242 (1966); O'Boyle, Suitability,
in CONFERENCE ON ScuaRTEs REGULATION 94, 96-97, 105 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965) (Confer-
ence at Durham, North Carolina, Nov. 6-7, 1964); Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-
Dealers under SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REv. 15, 25 (1969).
19. N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 405, N.Y. STOCK ExcH., INC., CONSTITUTION AND RuinS
2405 (1975); Amer. Stock Exch. Rule 411, [1976] AMER. STOCK FXCH. GUmID (CCH) 9431.
20. The "Know Your Customer" rules have been the basis of complaints by persons
other than a broker's customers and for purposes other than to enforce a standard of
suitability in a broker's recommendations. For example, in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969), the trustee of a bankrupt cor-
poration sued a broker to recover corporate funds which the sole shareholder allegedly
had converted and invested in securities through Merrill Lynch. The plaintiff alleged that
Merrill Lynch knew of the conversion. Plantiff was successful in overcoming defendant's
motion for summary judgment. In Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), plaintiff was a former limited partner in Ira Haupt & Co.,
a brokerage firm that went bankrupt in the vegetable oil scandal. Plaintiff alleged that
Haupt did not ascertain essential facts about its customer, "Tino" DeAngelis, as required
by the rules, and that the exchange was liable for failure to enforce the rule against
Haupt. The court dismissed the complaint, finding that the exchange had no reason to
know of the violation. 403 F. Supp. at 1032-33. Cf. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch.,
503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (exchange found not to have
breached duty to investigate prospective member).
21. An interesting question which will have to await the development of the law
is whether a broker may in all cases open a speculative account for a financially unsophis-
ticated customer when that is the customer's own wish. In theory, he probably may, after
carefully explaining all of the risks to the customer, although the questions of whether
the customer could fully comprehend the risks of such an account and whether these
risks were adequately explained to him would surely be sources of potential litigation.
Cf. Architectural League of N.Y. v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Theory
aside, one might expect brokers to refuse as a matter of policy to take such accounts be-
cause of the risk of potential litigation.
22. Investment of all or a substantial portion of a customer's funds in a highly specu-
1977]
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The outer limits of this type of explicit broker responsibility
for.suitability have not been judicially defined.23 One could re-
sponsibly argue, for example, despite some contrary authority, 24
that a broker who attains a customer's objective on an overall in-
vestment portfolio should not be found liable even when one of his
investment decisions is clearly unsuitable. Disputes about the outer
limits of the doctrine will, however, probably remain academic for
some time, since the courts and counsel will be busy enough with
cases where the challenged investment selection represents an egre-
gious disregard of the suitability standard.
B. Enforcement of the Substantive Standard
A dispute has developed over whether a violation of stock ex-
change and NASD rules, including suitability rules, may, in addi-
tion to supplying the obvious basis for NASD or SEC disciplinary
action -against a broker, create a private right of action by a cus-
lative security* is clearly contrary to the principle of diversification. In Lybecker, Regula-
tion of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977, 996-97 (1973), the
author notes that the Comptroller of the Currency's Manual for Representatives in Trust
suggests, as a general rule for national banks handling personal trusts and estates, that
investment of more than 20 percent of the principal of a trust account in one company
may be undesirable and that concentration of more than 10 percent of the market value
of a common trust fund's portfolio in one company is contrary to the Comptroller's
Regulation 9 (12 C.F.R. § 9 (1976)). Less clear are potential legal responsibilities where
there is an overconcentration of the customer's funds in one seemingly conservative in-
vestment, resulting in actual underperformance of the customer's account. See generally
Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971).
23. Consider three situations:
(1) A middle-aged man or woman contacts a broker, telling him that he or she
wants good quality common stocks for long-term investment. The broker purchases low-
priced new issues and stocks rated as speculative by Standard & Poor's Corporation Stock
Guide.
(2) An elderly couple place their life savings with a broker and disclose their finan-
cial background to him, showing that their investment objectives are preservation of capi-
tal and production of income; the broker invests their account in the same type of stocks
as in the first example.
(3) A working widow with a growing family receiving income only from her salary
of $150 per week and from the $30,000 of insurance that her husband left her visits a
broker who opens a margin account for her and invests the entire account in low yield
glamour stocks (or in a speculative convertible subordinated debenture).
These are hypothetical examples of clear disregard by a broker of the suitability rule.
Example (3), however, would be a closer case without the use of the margin account-
and examples (I) and (2) would appear to be much more like mere negligence without
imputation of civil liability if only some of the investments were in outright speculations
and the remainder were in high or medium grade bonds and equities.
24. In re Bank of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364 NY.S.2d
164, 168 (1974). See also Trustees of Hanover College v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
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tomer against his broker.2 5 There is no such cause of action ex-
plicitly provided in the Securities Exchange Act, although section
27 does give the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions to
enforce "any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder." 26  Most private actions have been
Civil No. 71-C686 (S.D. Ind. filed Dec. 7, 1971). The trustees of the college sued for losses
on sixteen speculative securities, even though the college's portfolio as a whole was up.
Donaldson Lufkin Sued by Hanover College, Which Alleges It Mismanaged Endowment,
Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1971, at 9, col. 2. The college later amended its complaint to remove
its allegations of unsuitable investment. College Drops Claim Fund Was Mismanaged by
Donaldson Lufkin, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1972, at 11, col. 1. The suit finally was settled.
Donaldson Lufkin, College Say They Both Won Fight, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 6,
col. 3. The case is mentioned in Lipton, The Customer Suitability Doctrine, in PLI
OURTH ANNUAL INsTrruTE ON SEcuRnis REGULATION 273, 278-79 (R. Mundheim, A.
Fleischer, Jr. & J. Schupper ed. 1973); Lybecker, supra note 22, at 977.
In Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HAv. L. REv. 603. (1970), the author
suggests that a proper measure of risk is obtained by viewing the portfolio as a whole
where a particular security, although speculative in itself, may have a tendency to offset
some of the risks which the other securities in the portfolio necessarily create. An infer-
ence to be drawn from this Note is that it is easier to spread the risk in a large portfolio
where many securities are held than in a small portfolio. This helps explaili why the
management of small portfolios is difficult and why, in theory, mutual funds, closed-end
investment companies and common trust funds are more attractive. However, a compari-
son of the average performance of these funds over recent years with the Dow Jones and
Standard & Poor stock averages suggests that balancing of offsetting risks has not become
an exact science. See WIESENBERGER, INVESTMENT COMPANIES SERvICE (Mutual Funds &-
Closed-End Companies Supp. June 30, 1976) (summary comparison of the performance
of various types of mutual funds and dosed-end investment companies with the Dow-
Jones Industrial Average and the Standard and Poor 500 Stock Average for the six-month,.
one-year, and five-and-one-half-year periods ending June 30, 1976).
Another problem which a very large fund may have is pointed out in Lybecker,.
supra note 22, at 981 n.24. Large institutional portfolios are often diversified beyond the
degree indicated by the diversification- theory because if the portfolio were limited to the'
10 or so properly chosen securities which that theory predicts would be sufficient, the-
volume of each security still would be so large as to make it difficult or impossible for'the.
fund to buy or sell without substantially depressing the market.
25. For discussions of theories upon which the federal courts may find liability for
violation of stock exchange rules, see Allen, Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act for-
Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAw. 1493 (1970); Hoblin, A Stock Broker's
Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange,.
39 FOR.DHAM L. REv. 253 (1970); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange-
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-
Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q..
633 (1966); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47
DENVER L.J. 63 (1970); Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD
Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REv. 15 (1969); Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning
Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administra-
tive Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W.
REs. L. REv. 925 (1966); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for-
Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALiF. L. REv. 1120 (1970); 43 FoIHAza L. REv. 493
(1974); 83 HAv. L. REv. 825 (1970); 8 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 151 (1975); 24 Sw. L.J. 384 (1970);-
44 TutL. L. REv. 633 (1970); 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 551; 121 U. PA. L. REv. 388 (1972).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
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brought on the theory that a cause of action for violation of the
suitability rules can be based on this section.2 7
Cases concerning exchange and NASD rules actually have in-
volved two issues: whether to imply a cause of action at all under
section 27; and whether to imply a cause of action for violation of
the particular rule involved. However, discussions of the issues
have tended to mix them together and use them in an overlapping
fashion. Many of the arguments are analogous to those involved in
the implication of a private cause of action under a statute alone.
Much of the learning on private rights of action under the
federal securities laws stems from the 1964 case of J.I. Case v.
Borak,2 in which the Supreme Court approved the implication of
a cause of action for violations of section 14(a) of the 1934 act on
the grounds that (1) the purpose of the section is the protection of
investors29 and (2) private enforcement is necessary to supplement
SEC regulation and "make effective the congressional purpose."80
Many of the cases to be discussed below involving implication of
private causes of action for violations of NASD and exchange rules
were decided under this standard. However, the Supreme Court
has been more reluctant recently to imply private rights of action
where Congress has established what appears to be a complete
scheme of administrative regulation.3 1 In Cort v. Ash,82 decided in
1975, the Court listed four factors to be considered in determining
whether a private cause of action is implicit in a statute:
27. It also might be argued that suits under the rules could be brought under the
general federal question jurisdiction section, 28 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). See, e.g., Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 858 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 817
(1966).
28. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
29. Id. at 482.
30. Id. at 433.
81. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (no private right of action, after creation of the
Federal Election Commission, by shareholder against corporate officer who allegedly vio-
lated section prohibiting corporate contributions); Securities Investors Protection Corp.
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (no private right of action by investors against corpora-
tion. to afford them protection); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 458 (1974) (no private right of action to enjoin railroad
route discontinuance under the Rail PassengerService Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644
(1970)). The Court in these cases distinguished and did not explicitly overrule cases imply-
ing private rights of action from statutes. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79 n.ll (1975).
But they may indicate a less favorable attitude toward implying private rights of action.
Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required for liability to
private party under Rule 10b-5).
82. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
[Vol. 26
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First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted" . . . ?33 Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? . . . [Fourth], is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?34
The Ninth Circuit has said in dictum that, while the parties
had not argued the point, the new Supreme Court tests in Cort
would not change its view that a private right of action may be
implied under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act.3 5 A dis-
trict court in Texas has held, on the other hand, that the Cort
criteria preclude implication of a private right of action under the
NASD's suitability rule.36 Since other circuits have not yet spokefi
on the issue since Cort, one can not yet discern a consensus or
trend. The following discussion of cases decided before Cort must
therefore be read with that caveat in mind.
The Second Circuit has said in dictum that a private cause of
action may be implied under an exchange rule. Writing for the
court in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,3 7 Judge Friendly
stated:
[IT]he concept of supervised self-regulation is broad enough to en-
compass a rule which provides what amounts to a substitute for
regulation by the SEC itself .... [T]he court must look to the
nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme,
with the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying
a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the viola-
tion is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for implication
88. 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 83, 89 (1916)).
84. 422 U.S. at 78.
35. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 166 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1876 (N.D. Tex. 1976). One factor in the
Lange decision was a finding, under Cort's second criterion, that there was legislative
history indicating an intent not to allow private causes of action. The argument is that
since section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, which voids agreements to waive statutes and rules,
refers explicitly to "rules of an exchange," then if Congress had intended to create a
private cause of action under section 27(a), it would have referred to them there also.
One counterargument is that an exchange or NASD rule can be a "duty" under section
27(a). Issuance by the SEC of a regulation covering a segment of the brokerage industry
which is substantially identical to a stock exchange rule covering another segment permits
the inference that the exchange rule is part of the regulatory scheme and therefore con-
stitutes a "duty" under the act.
87. 858 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 817 (1966).
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would be the strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty un-
known to the common law.88
In the case before the court, which involved an alleged failure to
deal consistently "with just and equitable principles of trade,""0 the
complaint was dismissed, the court stating that the particular rule
at issue was a "catch-all," intended only as a basis for disciplinary
proceedings.40 The court apparently was asserting, however, that
for a stock exchange rule to be the basis of an implied federal cause
of action, it must: (1) be fairly specific; (2) be intended to protect
investors rather than to regulate brokers' internal affairs or ethics;
and, possibly, (3) impose a duty unknown at common law.
A strong argument would then appear to exist that the NASD
and exchange suitability rules are substitutes for Commission
regulation, since the SEC itself has adopted a suitability rule cov-
ering all other areas of the securities industry. 1 Indeed, the SEC
rule was issued pursuant to section 15(b)(10), which was added in
1964 to insure that brokers who are not members of the NASD
would be subject to similar regulation by the SEC.42 Other com-
mentators have argued, however, that the suitability rule, phrased
as a positive command rather than as a prohibition, is insufficiently
specific,43 and that the rule was intended as an ethical exhortation,
as much for the protection of the reputation of the broker-dealer
industry as for customers.44
The court in Colonial Realty did not appear to require the
existence of fraudulent conduct in addition to violation of the
exchange rule as a condition for implying a cause of action. None-
theless, some district courts in the Second Circuit have required
-such fraud for a cause of action under an exchange rule,40 as has
38. Id. at 182.
39. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULES art. XIV, 1656 (1975); NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, [1975] NASD SECURiTIES DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) 2151.
40. 358 F.2d at 182.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1976). A comparable argument based on the similarity
of NYSE rule 405 and SEC rule 15b10-4 was rejected in McMaster Hutchinson g.
Co. v. Rothschild & Co., [1972-1973] FED. SEC. L. REtP. (CCH) 93,541 (N.D. Ii. 1972),
42. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nvs 3013, 3032; see 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2891 (2d ed. 1962, Supp. 1969).
43. See, e.g., Rediker, supra note 18, at 50-51.
44. See, e.g., id.
45. Carroll v. Bear, Steams & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Schonholtz
v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D.N.Y.), afI'd per curian, 505
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616, 623 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). Other district court cases in the Second Circuit have survived motions to dismiss,
but a careful reading of the opinions indicates the courts were reserving decision con-
[Vol. 26
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the Seventh Circuit, even while establishing a seemingly more
liberal test for determining which rules may be bases of private
causes of action. In Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.,4 for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he
touchstone in determining whether or not the violation of a par-
ticular rule is actionable should properly depend on its design 'for
the direct protection of investors.' 47 It found that the New York
Stock Exchange "Know Your Customer" rule was for the protec-
tion of the public, and therefore could be the basis of a cause of
action.48 However, the court seemed also to require fraud in the
violation of the rule.49 Since most types of fraud should already be
actionable, independently of a suitability rule violation, it is not
clear how the Buttrey holding adds any substance to its primary
concern for the investors.
The Third Circuit has indicated that it would be reluctant to
imply liability for violation of an exchange rule. In Landy v.
FDIC,50 the court pointed out that it would be anomalous to refuse
to imply liability for a violation of the exchange suitability rules,
since the SEC suitability rule would provide a basis for holding
liable brokers covered by it." The court asserted, however, that it
would permit an implication of liability "reluctantly," if at all,
because:
(1) accurate evaluation of the degree to which any particular rule
represents SEC policy is often difficult, if not impossible .. .; (2)
imposition of liability might chill the process of self-regulation by
creating fear of damaging liability; and (3) [unlike SEC rules,]
exchange rules are not promulgated by a government body after
cerning liability until development of the facts at trial. Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCII) 93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). A similar
result obtained in Draicchio v. H.S. Equities, Inc., Civ. No. 1970-435 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
The Second Circuit has not had occasion to elucidate the Colonial Realty doctrine further,
stating only:
we do not now take the position . . . that violation of an exchange rule cannot
under any circumstances give rise to civil liability under the federal acts. Such
a position would be in conflict with our own most recent statements on this sub-
ject as well as some of the developing case law.
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). But see Wolfson :
Russo, supra note 25, at 1129-30.
47. 410 F.2d at 142, citing Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based on Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 12, 29 (1966).
48. 410 F.2d at 142.
49. Id.
50. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
51. Id. at 166 n.23.
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careful deliberation and weighing of the variegated competing
public interests. 52
The Ninth Circuit has not ruled generally on whether causes
of action are to be implied for violations of NASD or exchange
rules. However, in one case, Hayden v. Walston & Co.,O it refused
to allow a private cause of action for failure of a salesman employed
by a broker-dealer to register with the NASD, since "the [registra-
tion] requirement does not set a duty with respect to a particular
securities transaction."5 4 The District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, however, has twice held that private causes of
action may be implied, with the proviso that scienter is necessary
in actions involving the suitability rule. 5
The requirement of intentional or willful violation of an
exchange or NASD rule as a prerequisite to an independent cause
of action would appear to comport with and be required by the
recent Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.6
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court decided that scienter must be
present in order to find a violation of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5,
and, by strong dictum, suggested that proof of scienter would also
be required in a cause of action based on any other section of the
Exchange Act where Congress did not specifically indicate that re-
covery was to be based on negligence or innocent mistake. In addi-
tion, the Second Circuit's concern, expressed in Colonial Realty,
that the federal courts would become the arbiters of every garden
variety of suit between customer and broker, would be avoided by
requiring, for recognition of a federal claim, not only that the par-
ticular rule be one designed for the protection of investors, but
that the breach be substantial, willful, or in reckless disregard of
fiduciary duties. This additional requirement that professional
standards be clearly violated would fit the theory advanced by one
court that by holding himself out as a broker, one impliedly repre-
sents to the public that he will deal fairly with them; when he
intentionally fails to do so, it is a form of fraud. 7
52. Id.
58. 528 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1975).
54. Id. at 902.
55. McMillan v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp. 1158 (ND. Cal. 1975); Wells
v. Blythe & Co., 851 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972), citing Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969). See also Geyer v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wy. 1975).
56. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
57. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
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Although private enforcement of the NASD suitability and
stock exchange "Know Your Customer" rules has not fared well in
some circuits, the rules and the duties imposed can be ignored by
brokers only at the risk of disciplinary proceedings and potential
civil liability for damages. Even in jurisdictions and courts where
the suitability rule is not allowed to come in the front door as an
independent right of action, it is nevertheless frequently allowed
in the back door as evidence in pendent state common law claims
such as negligence.58
II. CHURNING
A standard of suitability and fiduciary responsibility with re-
spect to the number of transactions which is proper for a customer's
account also is evolving. Where there is excessive trading in an
account ("churning"), the customer can be damaged in many ways.
He must pay the brokerage commissions on both purchases and
sales, he may miss dividends, incur unnecessary capital gain or
ordinary income taxes depending on the holding period, and, most
difficult to measure, he may lose the benefits that a well-managed
portfolio in long-term holdings might have brought him.
Sources of liability for churning include the suitability and
"Know Your Customer" rules, and SEC rules 1 Ob-5 and 15cI-7(a). 9
To establish churning, the customer must show that the broker had
some discretion in the handling of the account.60 A broker simply
following instructions of a customer will not be held liable for any
damages suffered by the customer through excessive trading. Courts
are most likely to find liability for churning if the customer is un-
sophisticated, not highly educated, lacking in business experience,
786 (1944). See also Kohn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring);
Starkman v. Seroussi, 877 F. Supp. 518, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Brudney, Origins and Limited
Applicability of the "Reasonable Basis" or "Know Your Merchandise" Doctrine, in PLI
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcuarras REGULATION 85 (A. Fleisher, Jr., R. Mundheim
9- J. Schupper ed. 1972); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrris REGULATION 676-81 (4th ed.
1977); E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS ch. 16 (1965).
58. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975);
Mahony v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,354 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mercury Ins. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160
(S.D. Tex. 1969).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (a) (1976); see McMillan v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp.
1153 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
60. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975).
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and in infrequent contact with his broker.'1 In at least one case, a
court has found divided control and, in effect, divided the damages.
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co. 6 2 was an action by a widow against
a broker who had churned her account. The broker had visited her
at least every week to discuss the previous week's trading, and had
her absolute trust. On the basis of the lower court's finding that the
widow had known what was going on in her account, and was
therefore barred by estoppel, laches, and waiver from claiming her
full loss, the Ninth Circuit allowed her to recover only the commis-
sions and interest that she had paid, in effect dividing responsibility
by halving the possible recovery.3
The customer who can establish fiduciary responsibility for
securities trading decisions must also establish the degree of exces-
sive trading that is culpable in relation to the size and nature of
the account. A turnover rate" that would not be excessive where
the investor was trying for profit from speculation in volatile stocks
might be excessive where an investor wished to conserve principal
and collect dividends. 5 A pattern of frequent "in and out trading,"
61. Id. Compare Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va.
1968) (broker held to have discretionary control over the account; plaintiff housewife had
a high school education and was infrequently in contact with the broker) with Carr v.
Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955) (salesman accepted discretionary control over
account despite instructions from his firm to the contrary; plaintiff housewife had a
high school education, had long worked for banks, was married to an accountant, was
frequently in contact with the broker, and received monthly confirmations). A regional
reputation for hardheadedness can hurt a plaintiff. See Nash v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 615
(D. Mass. 1955) (New England plaintiffs, self-made men with little formal education,
found in control of own accounts). Control by the broker seems to have been found
more readily when the customer was a woman, although this may be changing. See, e.g.,
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (31 of 50 complaining cus-
tomers were women; 12 were widows); O'Boyle, supra note 18, at 94, 101-02 (counsel settles
"claim [with) no justifiable basis" because it was brought by a widow with small children
and because the client had other SEC problems at the time).
62. 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
63. Id. at 1211-12.
64. A method often used to determine if an account is overactive is to compute the
turnover rate by dividing the aggregate amount of purchases by the average cumulative
monthly investment. The average cumulative monthly investment is arrived at by add-
ing the net investment in the account at the end of each month and dividing that sum
by the number of months in the period for which the turnover rate is being computed.
R.H. Johnson 8& Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 844 (1956); Reynolds & Co., 89 S.E.C. 902 (1960).
65.
While this evidence might suffice to support a churning verdict had it been
established that plaintiff's investment aims were solely related to the production
of dividend income and the conservation of principal, we think it to be irrefutable
that, notwithstanding his January 1962 letter, plaintiff's holding with Hemphill,
Noyes assumed the character of a trading account shortly after July of that year.
Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 (1st Cir. 1973).
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where a security is purchased and then sold a short time later,66
and a finding that the commissions from the allegedly churned ac-
count constitute a disproportionately large segment of the broker's
total income 7 also can help establish liability for churning.
How many transactions are excessive? Not surprisingly, the
judicial decisions in this field, as in the case of the suitability and
"Know Your Customer" rules, invariably concern extreme cases,
with such high turnover rates as 11.5 or 8.04 times in a period of
six years and ten months,6" 1.13 times in a 29-day period,69 1.37
times in thirteen days,70 and 12 times per month.71 One 1967 study
of the SEC cases concluded that a turnover rate of more than once
every two months is likely to be characterized as excessive.72 These
turnover rates may be contrasted with those of institutional in-
vestors. In a study in 1969-1970, the SEC found that the common
stock portion of the "typical" advisory account had a turnover rate
of 21.3 percent per year. 73
Because not only the customer's own money, but also that
which he has borrowed from his broker, is being switched from
security to security, the effect of churning in a margin account can
be truly insidious. In the Fourth Circuit case of Carras v. Burns,74
the turnover rate in an estate's account in one month was 1.13
(3.96 on the estate's own money); in a later two-week period it was
1.37 (5.02 on the estate's own money).75 During the 14 months fol-
lowing Mr. Carras' death, in an account of only $1,083,282 ($529,-
920 net equity), there were 194 trades involving 104,443 shares
having a market value of $2,888,480. These trades generated bro-
kerage commissions and service charges of $27,183, and a net loss
of $547,214. 76 Indeed, the account was so badly handled during a
time of precipitous market decline that the court found it impos-
sible to determine what the account might have been worth but
66. Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975).
67. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aIJ'd,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
68. Id.
69. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d at 255.
70. Id.
71. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
72. Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. R V. 869, 876 (1967).
73. SEC, INsUrrtIrONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 170 (1971).
74. 516 F.2d 251.
75. Id. at 255.
76. Id. at 254-56.
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for the churning, and decided damages should be limited to the
commissions, service charges, and taxes attributable to trading."
The result is an intriguing paradox: if a broker believes he is going
to be charged with excessive trading, he may be better off if he
does such a thorough job of it that a court will merely order him
to return his commissions! The federal courts have in general had
great difficulty fashioning a satisfactory measure of damages for
churning;78 because it is a difficult factual determination, the mini-
mum rate at which churning is to be found for various types of
accounts has yet to be, and may never be, established. Still, the doc-
trine of churning exists as a test, albeit a somewhat hazy one, which
the courts may apply in appropriate cases to remedy unsuitable
transactions in a brokerage account.
III. MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
Margin rules limit the amount of borrowed money that a cus-
tomer may use in his account and, to a limited extent, the type of
security that he may purchase on credit. There are basically two
types of margin requirements. The initial margin requirements
regulate the proportion of a security's purchase price that may be
financed by the broker. These requirements are set from time to
time by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
pursuant to section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7'
Maintenance margin rules, which require the customer's equity to
be maintained on a day to day basis at a certain minimum percent-
age of the market value of all the securities long in the account,
have been issued by both major stock exchanges0 and the NASD"1
77. Id. at 259.
78. See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 849-51 (E.D. Va. 1968).
The court rejected (1) the loss of the bargain theory of damages (the award of profits
which a well-managed account would have yielded) as too speculative, and (2) the "out-
of-pocket" theory, where all losses in the account would be recovered, because it assumes
that all transactions in the account are improper and also would bar recovery where
churning results in a profit. The court settled on a quasi-contractual measure and
awarded the plaintiff an amount equal to the brokerage commissions and New York
State transfer tax paid, plus the capital gains taxes which plaintiff paid excluding those
incurred in order to withdraw funds from the account for her personal use.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970). Pursuant to section 7, the Board of Governors has issued
and from time to time amended regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1977). Regulation U, 12
C.F.R. § 221 (1977), also issued by the Board, governs the amount which a person may
borrow from a bank for the purpose of purchasing securities.
80. N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 431, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., CONSTrtrrlON AND RuLES
2431 (1975); Amer. Stock Exch. Rule 462, [1976] AMER. STOCK ExCH. GUiDE (CCI) 9472.
81. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, app. A, § 4, [1975] NASD SECUarIs
DEALERS MANUAL (CCI) 2180 A.
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pursuant to Regulation T,12 which permits the adoption of addi-
tional margin rules.
The Federal Reserve Board's initial margin regulations estab-
lish" a mathematical test. Basically it is unlawful for a broker to
make for a margin account a purchase which creates an excess of
the amount owing to the broker of such account over the maximum
loan value of the securities in the account unless the broker obtains
from the customer within five business days a deposit of cash or
securities at least equaling the amount of the excess., Failing such
deposit the broker must sell enough securities in the account to
eliminate the excess indebtedness.8 The present maximum loan
value of securities in a margin account is fifty percent.s5
These regulations also allow credit to be used only for the
purpose of purchasing securities listed on a national securities ex-
change or those stocks traded in the over-the-counter market,
which the Board determines to have a sufficient degree of national
investor interest, depth and breadth of market, availability of in-
formation, character and permanence.s6 Of course, limiting the use
of borrowed funds to the purchase of such stocks does not insure
that stocks of a speculative nature will not be acquired. The New
York and American stock exchanges surely have many of these.81
82. 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1976).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(b)(1)(i) (1976). This is after application of the customer's Spe-
cial Miscellaneous Account (SMA) which is a type of memorandum account used by most
brokerage firms for each customer. This account consists of cash deposited by the cus-
tomer, dividends on securities held in the account, the available portion of sales proceeds
of securities sold by the customer and any appreciation in market value of the securities
held in the account over their original purchase price. 12 C.F.R. § 220A(f)(6) (1976).
See Manevich v. duPont, 338 F. Supp. 1124, 1126-27 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 465 F.2d 1398 (2d
Cir. 1972). See also McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 912 (1975).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(e) (1976). In certain situations an extension of time may be
granted beyond the five-day period for "one or more limited periods commensurate with
the circumstances" by a committee of a national securities exchange or a national se-
curities association. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(f) (1976).
85. 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1976).
86. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.2(d)-(f); 220.8(f) (1976).
87. In issuing its list of over-the-counter stocks which qualify as margin securities,
the Board states:
CAUTION: It is unlawful for any person to make, or cause to be made, any
representation to the effect that the inclusion of a security on such list of OTC
margin stocks is evidence that the Board or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has in any way passed upon the merits of, or given approval to, such
security or any transaction therein.
12 C.F.R. § 220.2 (e) (5) (1976).
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The Board's margin regulations also regulate the extension of
credit in a customer's cash account (the usual type of account
where the customer is not using funds borrowed from the broker).
In this type of account, the broker must receive payment from his
customer within seven business days after a security is purchased
or must promptly sell the security."8
Although it is fairly certain that the protection of investors
was not the primary purpose of section 7 of the Exchange Act, it
was recognized by Congress as having that effect. 9 The broker has
been given responsibility for establishing accounts and monitoring
compliance with the restrictions. As a result, at least until recent
amendments, the margin rules were treated as limiting the risks
that a broker's customer could take, and placing on the broker the
responsibility for enforcing this limitation. The margin rules re-
semble the suitability rules in that both regulate risk-taking, despite
the fact that the determination of whether the margin rules have
been violated is a matter of objective arithmetic rather than of
second-guessing a broker's substantive investment judgment. This
effect of the margin rules is illustrated by Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German,0 a Second Circuit case involving a broker who failed to
sell convertible bonds when payment for them was not received
within the prescribed time. The broker was held liable, despite the
customer's knowledge of the violation, when the price of the bonds
dropped, because the "margin requirements forbid a broker to ex-
tend undue credit but do not forbid customers from accepting such
credit."9 1
Thus, the broker could arguably be found responsible even
for deliberate violations of the margin rules by his customer. After
Pearlstein was decided, Congress enacted, and the Federal Reserve
Board promulgated, regulations prohibiting an investor from ac-
88. 12 C.F.R. § 220A(c)(2) (1976).
89. Section 7 of the Exchange Act states that it is "[flor the purpose of preventing
the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities." 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a)
(1970). H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934), quoted by the court in Bell v. J.D.
Winer 9= Co., 392 F. Supp. 646, 652 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) indicates that the main purpose of
section 7 was not the protection of the individual investor although such a result was
expected as a "by-product" of the main purpose. The main purpose of the section was
to give a federal credit agency the power to reduce the aggregate amount of the country's
credit resources which can be directed into the stock market and out of more desirable
uses in industry and commerce.
90. 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
91. Id. at 1141.
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cepting credit in violation of margin rules. 92 A district court in
New York recently held that while the main purpose of these mar-
gin rules is to "control the 'infusion of unregulated foreign credit
into the American securities markets,' ,,93 a collateral effect was to
"restore the in pari delicto defense which Pearlstein under-
mined.... ."I" The Second Circuit recognized these changes in the
law when Pearlstein came up again on the issue of damages, saying
that "[t]he effect of these developments is to cast doubt on the con-
tinued viability of the rationale of our prior holding."'95
Besides the question of whether or not the customer is actu-
ally in pari delicto,0 courts in future margin cases most likely will
consider the same factors as in the stock exchange rule and churn-
ing cases. These include the relationship between the parties, the
financial sophistication of the customer, and whether the broker's
violation is intentional, and therefore "fraudulent," or part of a
general mismanagement of the customer's account. For example, in
Lantz v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc.9 7 a district court judge de-
nied a motion for summary judgment by defendant brokers, despite
holding that section 7(f) had restored the in pari delicto defense. 98
The court stated that to assert the defense, "it is necessary for the
defendant to show that the fault of the parties is 'clearly mutual,
simultaneous, and relatively equal.' -9 The court cited, as evidence
of unequal fault on the part of the parties, allegations that the
brokers acted alone in seeking extensions of the margin require-
ment, that the plaintiff was not aware of the margin requirement,
and that the defendant actively misled the plaintiff regarding the
requirement. 100
The maintenance margin rules issued by the exchanges and
the NASD 1'0 supplement the initial margin rules of the Federal
Reserve Board; a customer might therefore argue that they fill a
92. 15 US.C. § 78g(f) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1976).
93. Bell v. J.D. Winer & Co., 392 F. Supp. 646, 653-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. Id. at 654.
95. 527 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975).
96. See Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd
inem., 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288
F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
97. 418 F. Supp. 653 (D. Alas. 1976).
98. Id. at 654.
99. Id., citing James v. DuBreiul, 500 F.2d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 1974).
100. 418 F. Supp. at 654-55.
101. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
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void in the regulatory scheme under the Colonial Realty test.10 2
Nevertheless, violations of the supplemental margin rules have not,
without more, been held to be actionable by private parties in the
federal courts. 10 3 In this respect, plaintiffs bringing suit under them
have fared similarly to plaintiffs alleging violations of the stock ex-
change suitability rules. As with such rules, the chief stumbling
block has been whether the rules were enacted to protect investors
or to protect brokers. The Fourth Circuit has held that because
the maintenance margin rules were established primarily to protect
the solvency of brokers, a private cause of action for their violation
should not be implied, absent fraud.0 4
A second question common to both margin and exchange suit-
ability rule cases has been whether scienter is necessary for a private
cause of action. The Fifth Circuit 10 has denied a private action in
the absence of allegations of fraud, while a district court in the
Second Circuit has allowed one when fraud was alleged.10
IV. MARKET-MAKING AND SELF-DEALING
Another area of fiduciary duties of a broker to his customer
involves rules requiring a broker to disclose when he is acting as a
principal and when he is making a market. 07 These rules also
have been held to provide a standard of conduct to which a cus-
tomer may hold his broker. A broker's failure to advise a customer
before completion of the transaction that the broker is acting as a
principal is defined by rule 15c1-4 as a "manipulative, deceptive,
or other fraudulent device or contrivance,"' 0 8 and thus a violation
102. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
103. See, e.g., McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 912 (1975).
104. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975).
105. McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620; cf. Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc.,
487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
106. Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
107.
The term 'market maker' shall mean a dealer who, with respect to a particular
security, holds himself out (by entering indications of interest in purchasing
and selling in an interdealer quotations system or otherwise) as being willing
to buy and sell for his own account on a continuous basis otherwise than on a
national securities exchange.
17 C F.R. § 240.17a-9(f)(1) (1976).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15ci-4(a) (1976).
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of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 09 The theory of the rule is
that the broker's intention to purchase or sell securities from his
own account in a transaction with his customer is a material fact
to which a reasonable investor in the customer's position would
attach importance." 0 When acting as an agent for a customer, a
broker is required to pursue the customer's interests with single-
minded devotion. When a broker is acting as a principal in buying
from or selling to his customer, he has a clear conflict of interest:
he wants the highest profit for his own account, a desire that may
often be inconsistent with his duty to get the best net price for his
customer. Rule 15cl-4 requires, however, only that written notifi-
cation be sent to the customer before completion of the transaction,
not prior to initiating the transaction. In Batchelor v. Legg & Co.,"'
a Maryland district court held, moreover, that this notification re-
quirement is satisfied by coded confirmation slips sent to investors
after their orders are executed. The form of notification tradi-
tionally used in the brokerage industry is a code symbol on the
front of a confirmation slip, translated in small type on the back.
It seems to be part of the tradition to have this message printed in
faint type, as if the capacity of the broker were a matter of interest
to only the most querulous customer. This manner of disclosure,
dangerous enough in the ordinary situation, can become seriously
deficient if the court finds that a fiduciary relationship exists be-
tween the customer and the broker acting as a principal.
Despite the existence of the rule requiring disclosure of a
broker's status as principal, courts have also relied upon some prior
or special relationship between the investor and broker before find-
ing a cause of action under rule 1 Ob-5 for nondisclosure of material
facts. For example, in Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co.,"'2 the district
court noted that the customer, a physician, had been a customer of
the defendant firm for twenty-five years, had dealt with one man
for fifteen, and only rarely had gone against the broker's recom-
mendations."3 Although the broker had met the Batchelor standard
for disclosure," 4 the court seemed to require more, both because
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
110. Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 374 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
111. 52 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971).
112. 374 F. Supp. 36.
113. Id. at 42.
114. Id. at 43.
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there was a relationship of trust and because the broker had
changed his position from agent to principal. 11 Similarly, in
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,1 6 a leading Second Circuit case,
the existence of a prior relationship contributed to the court's
finding of a violation. The defendant broker was sponsor of plain-
tiff investor's radio program and had made strong recommenda-
tions of purchase concerning securities in which the broker was
making a market. Writing for the majority, Judge Smith noted that
the nondisclosure was material because, "[a]n investor who is at
least informed of the possibility of such adverse interests, due to
his broker's market making in the securities recommended, can
question the reasons for the recommendation.""1 7 Judge Friendly,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, noted that a brokerage
firm acting with several others as market makers performs the use-
ful function of reducing the spread between the purchase and sale
prices of the security in the over-the-counter market." 8 Also, he
said, a "market maker, who buys as well as sells, is less likely to be
interested in palming off a stock than a dealer with only a long
position."' 9 The Chasins court was influenced by a special study
of the securities market, 20 and by an NASD rule which required
disclosure in prospectuses and advertising literature of a broker's
market making status. This rule did not directly apply to the case;
its application is another example of a stock exchange rule gaining
judicial recognition and force without the need for its becoming
the basis of a separate federal right of action.' 21
115. Id. at 46-47.
116. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
117. Id. at 1172. See also Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1080
(S.D.N.Y. 1972):
When a registered representative is giving more than the normal amount of
incidental investment advice, and has instilled in the customer such a degree of
confidence in himself and reliance upon his advice that the customer clearly
feels, and the registered representative knows that the customer feels, that the
registered representative is acting in the customer's interest, a fiduciary relation-
ship may arise .... Haley 8: Co., 37 S.E.C. 100, 106 (1956).
When it does arise the federal courts can be extremely strict. The Courtland court held
for the customer under rule lOb-5 even though it found that she had a "shared larcenous
intent" to purchase securities before publication of the broker's widely read market letter
on the basis of advance information of what the letter would recommend, and sell them
after its publication. 340 F. Supp. at 1085.
118. 438 F.2d at 1176.
119. Id.
120. H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1 at 386-87 (1963).
121. In a case following Chasins, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972), the Supreme Court decided that mixed-blood sellers of stock in a corporation
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As in other actions based on exchange or NASD rules, scienter
has been held necessary. 22 This is in keeping with Ernst & Ernst'
v. Hochfelder,12 which requires it for all rule 1Ob-5 actions.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of a federal common law of suitability and fidu-
ciary duties will continue. The federal courts will draw upon the
Exchange Act, the Congressional purpose behind it, and the rules
of the SEC, the exchanges, and the NASD to supply standards of
conduct demanded of a broker. Very likely this evolution is part
of a larger process. Inexorably and perhaps to his own horror, the
broker is being elevated to the status and, consequentially, the re-
sponsibility of a fiduciary.
holding certain oil, gas and mineral rights to Indian lands had been misled by a group
who were buying and selling these interests for their own account. The case certainly is
different from the usual one involving a market-maker in the over-the-counter market.
The group were employees of a bank which had been retained as the corporation's trans-
fer agent and which agreed to act for the individual stockholders. Although the stock in
the corporation was a "security" within the definition of the Exchange Act, it was not
in the type of market where one might expect his agent to be a dealer.
122. Architectural League of New York v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. 425 US. 185 (1976).
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